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COMMENTS 
REAL PROPERTY - EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION - CREATION OF 
EASEMENTS BY IMPLIED RESERVATIONS IN MICHIGAN- In 1910 K 
occupied an "old" house located on the westerly portion of her lot 
fronting on H Street. She built a "new" house on the east side of 
the lot, moved into it, and rented the "old" house to tenants. As 
a means of access to the west side and rear of the "new" house, she 
built and used a sidewalk which led from H Street between the 
two houses and which was one foot from the west side of the "new" 
house. This walk "was the only outdoor means of access to the new 
house's coal chute."1 
In 1912 K conveyed the "old" house portion of the lot to X 
from whom defendants traced title. The deed to X described the 
portion conveyed as thirty-six feet in width. That made the con-
veyance include the sidewalk and even a portion of the eaves of 
the "new" house which was retained by K. Despite this deed, the 
sidewalk was used by K (together with X and successors) for many 
years. 
In 1944 K conveyed the easterly portion-the "new" house part 
-to a grantee through whom plaintiff claims. The occupants of 
both portions continued to use the walk until 1955 when defend-
ants razed the "old" house and built a structure that prevented any 
further use of the walk. In the resulting litigation the question 
was whether plaintiff had a right to use the walk as against de-
fendants. The possibility of an easement by prescription appar-
ently was quickly eliminated, presumably because the user after 
1912 was not adverse. The case then turned upon whether K, in 
1912, had impliedly reserved an easement over the premises now 
belonging to defendants, an easement represented by the walk. 
The trial court upheld the position of the defendants-no such 
easement. On appeal, held, reversed, Harrison v. Heald, 360 Mich. 
203, 103 N.W.2d 348 (1960). 
A lawyer consulted by plaintiff would probably have been im-
pressed by the fact that K had so adapted and used the two parts of 
the lot as to subject the "old" house part to a use for the benefit of 
the "new" house part. He would quickly dismiss the idea that 
Michigan legislation would solve the problem. Turning to the 
case law, he may have noted Smith v. Dresselhouse2 in which 
Ostrander, J., said: 
1 Harrison v. Heald, 360 Mich. 203, 204, 103 N.W. 2d 358 (1960). 
2152 Mich. 451,454, 116 N.W. 387 (1908). 
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"It is a general rule of the law of easements that where 
the owner of two tenements sells one of them, the purchaser 
takes the portion sold with all the benefits and burdens which 
appear at the time of the sale to belong to it as between it and 
the property which the vendor retains." 
Our attorney might or might not have observed that in 
Covell v. Bright,8 decided not long after the Dresselhouse case, 
the court said: "To entitle the complainant to a decree the burden 
was upon him to establish that the servitude was apparent, con-
tinuous, and strictly necessary to the enjoyment of his lands." 
The easement claimed in the Covell case was by implied reser-
vation, while the one in question in Dresselhouse ·was by implied 
grant. Perhaps plaintiff's lawyer might have noticed this. But he 
may also have found Kamm v. Bygrav& and Rannels v. Marx5 in 
which the court, quoting from a Connecticut case, 6 said that when 
a grantor conveys part of his land, 
"[T]he law implies that with the grant of the one an 
easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in 
the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses 
and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of 
the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in 
which it appeared and was used when the grant was made." 
0£ course, the lawyer should notice that the doctrine enunci-
ated by the court in the Kamm and Rannels cases, as well as in the 
Connecticut case, was dictum so far as implied reservations are con-
cerned. This same dictum may be found in Dresselhouse, but re-
jected in Covell. He might, however, find some comfort in the 
fact that the opinion in the Kamm case was written by Mr. Justice 
Black who presumably would be sitting in his case if it reached the 
highest court. 
Now let us see what a lavvyer consulted by defendants might 
be expected to have found in the Michigan case law. 
Presumably he early would have noticed Brown v. Fuller.1 In 
that case the court had to rule on a claim of an easement of drain-
age claimed to have been created by implied reservation. The 
Dresselhouse case apparently had been relied upon by the trial 
court. The reviewing court, after pointing out that the Dressel-
a 157 Mich. 419, 423, 122 N.W. 101 (1909). 
~ 356 Mich. 189, 96 N .W .2d 770 (1959). 
5 357 Mich. 453, 98 N.W .2d 583 (1959). 
6 Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637, 643, 46 A.2d 898, 901 (1946). 
7 165 Mich. 162, 130 N.W. 621 (19ll). 
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house case involved a claim of implied grant, denied the claim of 
the drainage easement. Judge Ostrander who had authored the 
dictum in Dresselhouse was one of the prevailing judges in Brown 
v. Fuller. It was pointed out that an early English case, Pyer v. 
Carter,8 had indicated a view that an easement could arise by im-
plied reservation as easily as one by implied grant, but that the 
Pyer doctrine had "frequently been severely criticized, and was 
finally distinctly overruled in England" by Wheeldon v. Burrows.9 
Two members of the court dissented, but not on the ground that 
the Dresselhouse dictum was sound. On the contrary, their view 
was that the facts in Brown v. Fuller presented an instance of "strict 
necessity," and hence was within an exception recognized even by 
the English court. 
The English law as settled by Wheeldon may be briefly sum-
marized as follows. When the owner of Blackacre conveys a part 
of it and the deed is general in its terms, the owner cannot after-
ward take the position as against his grantee, or the grantee's suc-
cessors, that he did not convey the described land absolutely nor 
that the land is subject to an easement which at the conveyance 
arose in his favor. As the court expressed it, a grantor will not be 
allowed to "derogate" from his grant. Two possible exceptions to 
this general rule were recognized: (1) if the claimed easement is 
"strictly necessary" for the use and enjoyment of the retained land, 
and (2) if the claimed reserved interest is connected with an ease-
ment acquired by the grantee by implication in such a way that 
they are "reciprocal."10 
Decisions in American courts are far from harmonious. Al-
though Wheeldon v. Burrows had had quite a lot of support in 
addition to Brown v. Fuller, not a few courts have applied the 
doctrine of Pyer v. Carter that no distinction is to be drawn be-
tween implied grant and reservation. This latter view was ex-
pressed by way of dictum in Smith v. Dresselhouse. In the Restate-
ment of Property, section 476, a middle ground is taken. The fact 
that the claim is of an implied reservation rather than of a grant is 
81 H. & N. 916, 156 Eng. Rep. 1472 (Ex. 1857). 
9 12 Ch. D. 31 (1878). The court was of the opinion that Pyer v. Carter may have 
been rightly decided but not on the ground stated, namely that implied reservations are 
on the same footing as implied grants. It was thought that the Pyer case came within one 
of the exceptions to the broad doctrine that a grantor should not be allowed to derogate 
from his grant, which he attempts to do when he claims to have reserved an easement by 
implication. 
10 The court thought that Pyer v. Carter may have presented such a situation. 
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a "factor" to be taken into account; but it was found impossible to 
state how much weight should attach to that element.11 
The decision in Brown v. Fuller thus put Michigan clearly in 
accord with the English law announced in Wheeldon.12 Having 
reached this point in his study of the Michigan decisions, our 
hypothetical Ia-wyer for the defendants would want to see whether 
(a) later Michigan decisions had weakened the force of Brown v. 
Fuller or (b) Michigan law as thus indicated was wholly out of line 
with the law elsewhere. He would find among the Michigan de-
cisions two later cases in which the Michigan court had squarely 
faced the question of implied reservations. 
In Bubser v. Ranguette,13 in 1934, the doctrine of "strict neces-
sity" for an easement by implied reservation was applied. The case 
involved a portion of a building that encroached upon the land 
first conveyed. Bushnell, J ., said: 
"Having required strict necessity in cases involving stair-
ways, drains, ways and sewers, we prefer to make no exception 
to that rule in encroachment cases even though, in such cases, 
the servitude be plainly apparent. To make such an exception, 
would leave for further litigation the exact amount of en-
croachment necessary to make the user apparent. Nor should 
the law favor unrecorded servitudes." 
And as late as 1948, the court in Von Meding v. Strahl,14 speak-
ing through Butzel, J ., said that "where an owner who has used a 
roadway or pathway over one part of his land for the benefit of 
another part conveys the part over which the road passes, an ease-
ment for the benefit of his remaining land can only arise where 
there are apt words of reservation in the conveyance ... an implied 
easement cannot rest upon convenience." 
The defendant's lawyer could and should notice Burling v. 
Leiter15 which involved a claimed easement by implied grant, not 
reservation, because in his dissenting opinion in that case, Sharpe, 
]., repeated the discredited dictum of Smith v. Dresselhouse. The 
11 REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476, comment a (1944). See generally Comment, 57 
MrCH. L. REv. 724 (1959). 
12 Jn the prevailing opinion in Brown v. Fuller, supra note 7, the following language 
is found at pp. 167-68: "While it is apparent from the record that it will be somewhat 
expensive to dispose of the sewage from complainant's building otherwise than over 
defendant's land, it by no means appears that it is impossible to do so." 
13 269 Mich. 388, 395, 257 N.W. 845 (1934). 
14 319 Mich. 598, 605, 30 N.W.2d 363 (1948). 
15 272 Mich. 448, 262 N.W. 388 (1935). 
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quotation by Mr. Justice Sharpe was not in itself particularly signif-
icant. It became so because one member of the present court picked 
it up in his opinion in Kamm v. Bygrave, referred to above, and one 
of the cases relied upon in deciding the Harrison case, the subject 
of this discussion. The Kamm case alone was one of implied grant. 
In a footnote appended to the opinion the following appears: "Mr. 
Justice Nelson Sharpe dissenting in Burling v. Leiter ... quoted 
and relied on the rule of Smith [v. Dresselhouse], yet the majority 
at the time apparently overlooked it in a case which, on the facts, 
seemingly called for definite approval or repudiation thereof."16 
Could it be that the majority in the Burling case paid so little 
attention to the quotation by Mr. Justice Sharpe because (a) the 
quotation was a mere dictum both in the Smith and Burling cases, 
(b) it was taken from an English case that had later been repudiated 
by the English court, and ( c) it had been decisively repudiated by 
the Michigan court in the Covell and Brown cases nearly fifty 
years ago? Perhaps one or all of those reasons, rather than oversight, 
explained the court's disregard of the quotation. If the court in 
Kamm overlooked the difference between dictum and decision 
and also the difference between implied grant and implied reser-
vation, at least it is not the only court which has ever done so. 
This review of the law of easements by implication generally 
and in Michigan particularly indicates that the defendant's attor-
ney might have been warranted in believing with some confidence 
in his client's position and that the trial judge was on safe ground 
in his judgment. But the reviewing court disappointed him when 
it found its guide not in the prior decisions of the court, but in a 
succession of dicta. Perhaps one must conclude that when a dictum, 
despite its repudiation, is nevertheless repeated often enough, it 
acquires more significance as a guide in deciding cases than a line 
of actual decisions! 
Reasonable minds may differ over what the law regarding 
easements by implied reservation ought to be-opinions of courts 
have differed. If the court in the case under discussion had frankly 
pointed out that the rule of such cases as Wheeldon v. Burrows and 
Brown v. Fuller and succeeding cases ought, in their judgment, 
to be discarded, one might or might not agree. But the court de-
cided the Harrison case, so far as one can tell from the opinion, 
without the slightest recognition of the fact that they were in effect 
10 Kamm v. Bygrave, supra note 4, at 195. 
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repudiating a considerable line of decisions. Such an important 
case as Brown v. Fuller is not even mentioned. 
Now what is the law of Michigan in this field? How are Ia-ivyers 
to advise their clients, and how are trial judges to rule in the under-
standable hope that they will not be reversed? 
In another case, sometime in the future, the court may do what 
the English court did in dealing with Pyer v. Carter-approve the 
actual decision but not the ground upon which the court relied. 
If it is the law that an implied reservation will be permitted only 
when the easement is "strictly necessary," and this had been the 
law of Michigan, it might later be said that in the Harrison case 
there was a strict necessity and that the decision should have been 
put on that ground. "Strict necessity" is not an element the pres-
ence or absence of which can always be agreed upon unanimously. 
In Brown v. Fuller the facts were such that two members of the 
court thought the existence' of the claimed easement should be 
supported. Whether the element was present in the Harrison case 
is a question on which reasonable opinions might differ. If the 
court had reached its conclusion on that ground, this comment 
would never have been written.17 
Ralph W. Aigler* 
17 Games played without pre-determined rules are unthinkable. So with the more 
important affairs of life. The more this writer has dealt with law, the more definite is 
his opinion that in a surprisingly large area the chief merit in the law is not so much its 
content as its certainty. With outstanding exceptions, most people, it is believed, really 
want to conduct their affairs in accordance with the rule (the law). They often consult 
lawyers as to what those rules are, and in giving advice the lawyer is largely governed 
by what he figures the decision would be in a properly presented litigation. He rightly 
proceeds on the assumption that a court in the potential litigation would decide according 
to the law. While it is not maintained that the law, whether by statute or decision, 
should never be changed, it is submitted that perhaps too often courts in deciding a case 
lose sight of the fact that they are setting a guide for the people, for lawyers, and for trial 
judges, to say nothing of law teachers! With the pressures what they are upon many 
reviewing courts, a special burden is placed upon counsel. No doubt not a few decisions 
that stand out as aberrations are accounted for by slipshod preparation and presentations. 
The writer has not examined the record in our principal case so as to be in position to 
weigh this factor. 
• Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of 
Arizona.-Ed. 
